The letters dispatched from these regions of the empire reflect the cat-and- mouse game between Assyria and Urarṭu. Most of the letters that deal with relations between the Assyrians and the Urarṭians were written during the reign of Rusa I (c. 734-714 BC); [[117]] this Urarṭian king was one of the most warlike and ambitious adversaries faced by Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II. Two Assyrian military campaigns saw the rise and fall of this Urarṭian ruler: that of Tiglath-pileser III in 735 BC[[118]] followed by a campaign led by Sargon II in 714 BC.[[119]]
In the struggle between the two empires, smaller states and important cities that found themselves placed along the confines between the two empires also played an important role; these were Hubuškia,[[120]] Muṣaṣir,[[121]] Šubria, Ukku and Ulluba . The relationship between these cities and minor states and the two larger powers created friction and rivalry between Assyria and Uraṭu .[[122]] At times, these buffer states and cities were able to maintain an autonomous status by avoiding being swallowed up by their more powerful neighbours, exploiting the rivalry between the two. They were keen to stand by the empire that was able to guarantee their independence in the immediate future, and their real position in relation to either Assyria or Uraṭu was therefore often ambiguous say the least.[[123]]
Apart from the two decisive campaigns of 735 and 714 BC there may not have been other major conflicts in these regions.[[124]] The lack of extensive military activity was due to the strong Assyrian defences along their northern borders, characterized by the construction of a series of forts that became nerve centres not only for military activity but also for communication of intelligence information between the outposts and the heart of the empire .[[125]] In the letters concerning the north, the forts hold an importance characteristic of the Assyrian presence in the region.[[126]]
Through unswerving vigilance and a defensive system based on strongly garrisoned forts, the Assyrians made a frontal assault by Rusa I impossible. If it can be expected that there were similar defences along the Urarṭian lines, it comes as no surprise that open battle was avoided, given the difficulty for either side of penetrating in any decisive way into enemy territory.
The system, however, did not eradicate all armed conflict but merely confined it to lighter engagements. The letters contain accounts of some of these skirmishes and, more interestingly, even include a report of an Assyrian defeat. [[127]] The only possible route for Urarṭian expansion was therefore to the east.[[128]] Bearing that in mind, in 715 BC Rusa I decided to attack Assyria indirectly by annexing Mannea, a region vital for the supply of horses. [[129]] The Assyrian response to this tactic led Sargon II to prepare for his eighth military campaign which would become legendary. The campaign led to the fall of Rusa I in 714 BC.
Up until Sargon II's manoeuvre in Mannea, Assyrian activity in the regions to the east of the empire had been somewhat intermittent. Tiglath-pileser III led two campaigns to the east, the first in 744 BC, followed by another in 737 BC[[130]] and Sargon's involvement in the region stretched between 716 BC and 714BC.[[131]]
In general, the letters dispatched from this region are not easily datable, due partly to the presence of Daltâ, long-term ruler of Ellipi, who had an important role during the reigns of both Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II.
117 This is a " conventional" dating of Rusa I's reign (cf. e.g. Salvini in S. Kroll et al. [eds.], Biainili-Urartu [2012] 133) but 734 BC may of course be too early for Rusa; for alternative interpretations of the Urarṭian rulers of the late eighth century, see the discussions by Roaf (pp. 187 -216) and Fuchs (esp. the tables in pp. 145 , 149, 158) in the same volume.
118 See Tadmor Tigl. p. 134f, esp. note on line 21', and p. 234f.
119 See Fuchs Sar. p. 320ff.
120 See SAA 5, xviii for the changing of alliance by Hubuškia with Assyria and Uraṭu. For the location of Hubuškia, see Lanfranchi, "Assyrian Geography and Neo-Assyrian Letters: The Location of Hubuškia again," QGS 5 (1995) 127-137; Salvini, SAAB 11 (1997) 109-114 and Medvedskaya, "The Localization of Hubuškia," in Assyria 1995 p. 197-206.
121 Above all in Sargon's eighth campaign (714 BC) Muṣaṣir was in delicate equilibrium between Uraṭu and Assyria, see Salvini, Sargon et l'Urartu in Caubet Khorsabad pp. 144-146 and Dubovsky, SAAB 15 (2006) 141-146.
122 For a more detailed analysis of the northern regions between Assyria and Urarṭu, from both an historical and archaeological, as well as geographical, point of view, see Parker Mechanics.
123 See e.g. no. 77.
124 This does not mean that there had not been a long build up for these two major campaigns, probably including many smaller conflicts. Note also that the important battle between Tiglath-pileser Ill and Sarduri II in 743 BC was fought in the northwest, first in Arpad and then between Kistan and Halpi, the territories of Kummuhu (see RINAP I 35 i 21'ff, 39:20ff, 41:15ff, 47:45ff = Tadmor Tigl. Iran Stele I B, Summ. I, 3 and 7, see also ibid. p. 232).
125 See Parker Mechanics p. 77.
126 This can be concluded from the greeting formula of the letters dispatched from these regions. See the section "Different Introductory Formulae."
127 No. 71. See Aššur-le'i in the section "On Some Influential Figures in the Nimrud Letters."
128 In the west, the Urarṭian expansion was drastically and suddenly interrupted by Tiglath-pileser Ill in 743 BC. See n.124 above.
129 Lanfranchi, "The Assyrian Expansion in the Zagros and the Local Ruling Elites," in Lanfranchi, Roaf and Rollinger (eds.), Continuity or Empire? Assyria, Media, Persia (Padua 2003) 98f, notes how the supplies of horses from Mannea were of particular importance to the Assyrians, not least because by provisioning the major part of their troops they were automatically denying their Urartian rivals the same opportunity and in this way guaranteeing the continuing military superiority of the Assyrians.
130 For the first campaign to the east, see RINAP 1 6:7ff and nos. 7-8 (Tadmor Tigl. Ann. 10:7ff and Ann. 11-12, see also ibid. p. 232f) and for the second campaign, RINAP 1 15 :5ff and nos . 16-17 (Tadmor Tigl. Ann. 14*, 15-16 and ibid. p. 234f).
131 See SAA 15, xxiv-xxxv.
Mikko Luukko
Mikko Luukko, 'The North and East', The Correspondence of Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II from Calah/Nimrud, SAA 19. Original publication: Winona Laka, IN, Eisenbrauns, 2012; online contents: SAAo/SAA19 Project, a sub-project of MOCCI, 2021 [http://oracc.org/saao/saa19/babyloniaandthemukizerirebellion/thenorthandeast/]