The West and the Northwest

There are not very many extant letters from or concerning the northwest, the most famous of which is a draft or an archival copy of a letter sent by Sargon II to Aššur-šarru-uur (ND 2759, published as SAA 1 1). Nevertheless, one should not dismiss the other letters which deal with Que and Tabal, and the letters about Šubria and Tušhan also concern the northwest.

A much higher proportion of letters from the west is preserved, and these are beneficial from a chronological point of view. From the moment that it is possible to identify the province from which a letter was sent, it becomes possible to establish a post quem dating, i.e., that which coincides with the Assyrian subjugation of the region in question.

The only letter that indirectly mentions military action as regards the conquest of the west is no. 55. In this letter, Inurta-ila'i asks Tiglath-pileser III whether Tutammû, king of Unqi, having been defeated in 738 BC, should be transported with his eunuchs. Most of the letters from the region, however, deal with problems concerning the administration of the new provinces: their tributes and rationing being but two aspects which affected their infrastructure.

In general, what emerges from these letters is that in both the reigns of Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II, the main difficulty was maintaining a state of stability in the region; on the other hand, it is only natural that the letters sent to the heads of state from various governors, administrators and other dignitaries should deal principally with the problems that each encountered in trying to do his duty. Assyrian control of the area was ultimately complicated by two factors: the first were external powers, for example, the Ionians and Arabs, both of whom harried and raided the territory; and the second, those vassal states that continued their infighting, or states that simply did not recognize Assyrian authority.

Regarding the first problem, Tiglath-pileser III attempted to deal with the Ionians[[138]] who were marauding along the Levan tine coast,[[139]] while Sargon II fought with some of the Arab peoples, who, in the case of letter SAA 1 175 (ND 23 81), tried to attack a column of booty directed from Damascus to the Assyrian capital Calah. The constant fear and danger of attacks or raids is well expressed in the letters, and on more than one occasion the provincial guards are exhorted to be at their most vigilant.[[140]]

140 In the Levant and middle Euphrates, although forts are not mentioned with the same regularity as in the north, they represent an important element in the control of the region. No. 177 seems especially important as it concerns the expedition of a contingent of troops. Unlike the soldiers stationed in the eastern fort of Mazamua mentioned in SAA 5 215 (ND 2631)[[141]], the contingent described in no. 177 was made up solely of mobile troops. The different composition of the units stationed in the west, compared to those of the east, may reflect important geographical differences between the two regions. In a landscape mainly without natural barriers, such as significant hills or mountain ranges, characterized instead by flat desert plains, the Levant was easier to control and defend with mobile and rapid soldiers. Heavier infantry, although especially suited to a battle situation, were less useful when constant patrolling was of primary concern, given that one of the main characteristics of the Arab tribes was their mobility. Thanks to this high level of mobility, the Arabs were able to move quickly from one place to another, raiding where it best suited them. The only way to stop them, or at least limit their effectiveness, was to use camel- or horse-riding soldiers. This would have been the background, with mobility as the most important factor, against which the letter SAA 1 175 (ND 2381), discussed above, was composed.

As for the internal problems of the area, with the conquest of the Levant, the Assyrians inherited the ongoing conflicts between the existing peoples of the region.[[142]] Nos. 22 and 23 show the conflicts between Sidon and Tyre on the one hand and between Sidon/Tyre and the Assyrians on the other. Any problems emerging from these conflicts were to be resolved locally by the Assyrian governor Qurdi-Aššur-lamur.

From the moment that Assyrian penetration became directed towards the southern part of the Levant, a rivalry with Egypt was born. Even though the Assyrian presence in the south of Palestine during the reigns of Tiglath- pileser III and Sargon II was merely sporadic, the peoples of the region regarded Assyria as the power to reckon with, to the detriment of Egypt. Egypt had, over a long period, witnessed a progressive diminution of its authority in the regions of the southern Levant. In the second half of the eighth century BC, the international prestige of Assyria had overtaken that of Egypt; for example, in no. 29 Moab sent a request for help against the Qedarites to more distant Assyria rather than to neighbouring Egypt.

Apparently the Moabites were in a vassal relationship with Assyria at the time.[[143]] In any case, military confrontation between Assyria and Egypt had not yet taken place. At that moment the only field of competition between the two rivals was that of commerce. It is in this context that Assyria forbade the Sidonites to trade with Egypt and the Philistines.[[144]]



138 See no. 25.

139 Even though in the Nimrud Letters Sargon II is not in contact with the Ionians, he dealt with them during his reign; see J. Elayi and A. Cavigneaux, OA 18 (1979) 59-75.

140 Nos. 3, 37 and 173.

141 The garrison of the fort at Mazamua, situated in the north eastern region of the Assyrian empire, comprised both mobile troops and infantry (Gurreans and ltu'eans). The latter represented the main part of the force stationed there, 800 out of l ,430 in number (a figure that included both royal servants and woodcutters). see Postgate, 'The Assyrian Army in Zamua," Iraq 62 (2000) 89-108 (esp. p. 93).

142 See Galil, SAAB 6 (1992) 55-63 for a treatment regarding conflicts inherited by the Assyrians.

143 For Moab as a vassal of Assyria, see Vera Chamaza Moab pp. 6lff.

144 No. 22. For a recent discussion on the late eighth century relations between Assyria and Egypt, see S. Zamazalová, " Before the Assyrian Conquest in 671 B.C.E.: Relations between Egypt, Kush and Assyria," in J. Mynârova (ed.), Egypt and the Near East- the Crossroads (Prague 2011) 297-328.

Mikko Luukko

Mikko Luukko, 'The West and the Northwest', The Correspondence of Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II from Calah/Nimrud, SAA 19. Original publication: Winona Laka, IN, Eisenbrauns, 2012; online contents: SAAo/SAA19 Project, a sub-project of MOCCI, 2021 [http://oracc.org/saao/saa19/babyloniaandthemukizerirebellion/thewestandthenorthwest/]

 
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